International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator Journal Article

Overview

abstract

• Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition.

CU Boulder Authors

• Kaempfer, William H

publication date

• March 1, 2004

has restriction

• closed

Date in CU Experts

• July 10, 2014 9:50 AM

Full Author List

• Kaempfer WH; Lowenberg AD; Mertens W

author count

• 3

published in

• Economics and Politics  Journal

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

• 0954-1985

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

• 1468-0343

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00130.x

Additional Document Info

start page

• 29

end page

• 51

volume

• 16

issue

• 1