keywords
- Epistemology, Formal Epistemology
- Contact Info
Staffel, Julia
Positions
- Professor, Philosophy
- Assoc Chair, Philosophy
Research Areas
Research
Publications
selected publications
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book
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chapter
- Three Puzzles about Lotteries. 74-94. 2021
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journal article
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Suspension in Inquiry.
Episteme.
2025
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On the Relationship between Attitude and Process Norms. Comments on david Thorstad's Inquiry Under Bounds.
Philosophical Studies.
2025
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Are there transitional beliefs? - I think so?.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
1114-1136.
2025
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An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization.
Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy.
3247-3273.
2024
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Probability without Tears.
Teaching Philosophy.
65-84.
2023
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher-order evidence.
Noûs.
238-260.
2023
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Precis for Unsettled Thoughts.
Philosophical Studies.
3151-3154.
2022
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Replies to Fitelson and Konek.
Philosophical Studies.
3155-3167.
2022
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Updating incoherent credences - Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
435-460.
2022
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Pro tem rationality.
Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives.
383-403.
2021
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Normative uncertainty and probabilistic moral knowledge.
Synthese.
6739-6765.
2021
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Reasons Fundamentalism and Rational Uncertainty - Comments on Lord, The Importance of Being Rational.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
463-468.
2020
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?.
Noûs.
937-962.
2019
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Credences and suspended judgments as transitional attitudes.
Nous-Supplement: Philosophical Issues.
281-294.
2019
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The Importance of Being Rational.
Philosophical Review.
523-527.
2019
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A Process Model of Wisdom from Adversity.
Journal of Value Inquiry.
471-473.
2019
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Why be (approximately) coherent?.
Analysis.
405-415.
2018
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SHOULD I PRETEND I'M PERFECT?.
Res Philosophica.
301-324.
2017
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ACCURACY FOR BELIEVERS.
Episteme.
39-48.
2017
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can't be stably high credence.
Philosophical Studies.
1721-1734.
2016
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Disagreement and Epistemic Utility-Based Compromise.
Journal of Philosophical Logic.
273-286.
2015
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Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions.
Synthese.
1467-1493.
2015
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Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?.
Synthese.
3535-3551.
2013
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Reply to Roy Sorensen, 'Knowledge-lies'.
Analysis.
300-302.
2011
- Binding of reflexive pronouns in German. Snippets. 14-15. 2006
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Suspension in Inquiry.
Episteme.
2025
Background
education and training
- Ph.D., University of Southern California 2013
- B.A., Humboldt Univ of Berlin (Germany) 2007
- M.A., Humboldt Univ of Berlin (Germany) 2007