The Rewards to Running Journal Article

Overview

abstract

• This article explicitly compares the incentive and sorting theories of tournament performance in road races. Regressions omitting controls for runner ability suggest that runners record faster times the greater the loss they would suffer from finishing below their prerace ranking. However, the relationship between prize money at risk and finishing time weakens or vanishes with these controls. These results strongly suggest that races with large prizes record faster times because they attract faster runners, not because they encourage all runners to run faster.

CU Boulder Authors

• Zax, Jeffrey S

publication date

• November 1, 2000

has restriction

• closed

Date in CU Experts

• July 14, 2014 11:13 AM

Full Author List

• Lynch JG; Zax JS

author count

• 2

published in

• Journal of Sports Economics  Journal

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

• 1527-0025

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

• 1552-7794

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• https://doi.org/10.1177/152700250000100401

Additional Document Info

start page

• 323

end page

• 340

volume

• 1

issue

• 4