Parallel Imports in a Model of Vertical Distribution: Theory, Evidence and Policy Journal Article uri icon



  • Parallel imports are goods traded without the authorization of an original trademark or copyright owner. In this paper, a model where parallel imports arise because of incentive problems in vertical distributions is discussed. A distributor receiving goods from a manufacturer at a low wholesale price can profitably sell the goods in another country, outside the authorized distribution channel. The manufacturer can limit such parallel imports by raising wholesale prices, but this reduces vertical pricing efficiency. Parallel imports can thus occur in equilibrium. The model is supported by empirical evidence from existing studies and new econometric work. Policy implications of the analysis are discussed.

publication date

  • June 1, 2002

has restriction

  • closed

Date in CU Experts

  • June 30, 2014 10:35 AM

Full Author List

  • Maskus KE; Chen Y

author count

  • 2

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 1361-374X

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1468-0106

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 319

end page

  • 334


  • 7


  • 2