Craig on the actual infinite Journal Article uri icon

Overview

abstract

  • In a series of much discussed articles and books, William Lane Craig defends the view that the past could not consist in a beginningless series of events. In the present paper, I cast a critical eye on just one part of Craig's case for the finitude of the past – viz. his philosophical argument against the possibility of actually infinite sets of objects in the ‘real world’. I shall try to show that this argument is unsuccessful. I shall also take a close look at several considerations that are often thought to favour the possibility of an actual infinite, arguing in each case that Craig's response is inadequate.

publication date

  • June 1, 2002

has restriction

  • closed

Date in CU Experts

  • November 20, 2013 11:13 AM

Full Author List

  • MORRISTON WES

author count

  • 1

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0034-4125

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1469-901X

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 147

end page

  • 166

volume

  • 38

issue

  • 2