Loss Aversion and Strategic Opportunism: Third‐Party Intervention’s Role in War Instigation by the Weak | CU Experts

Overview

This paper seeks to explain the frequent phenomenon of the weaker side of an enduring rivalry instigating repeated military confrontations against a stronger foe. It builds on the proposition that when sensing they are in the domain of loss, leaders often take excessive risks in the hope of stopping or reversing their decline. This tendency to “gamble for recovery” is complemented by these leaders’ strategic opportunism, expecting and seeking foreign intervention to advance their agenda. This strategic opportunism in turn creates a moral hazard in that the prospect of foreign intervention can encourage these leaders to escalate disputes with their stronger counterpart in the first place. Therefore, interventions that prevent the stronger belligerent from crushing the weaker one and that mediate temporary truces may have a perverse effect of actually making some rivalries endure longer and the recurrence of military clashes more likely.

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