Financial advice and discretion limits Journal Article uri icon

Overview

abstract

  • AbstractBiased recommendations from financial advisors often lead to suboptimal portfolios and unnecessary fees. In response, many households have moved to digital platforms, so‐called “robo‐advisors,” that provide low‐fee financial advice based on the household's observable characteristics. We model the advisor–client relationship and show that delegation with limits on the advisor's choice set (i.e., discretion limits) reduces the negative consequences of biased recommendations. Moreover, our analysis suggests that human advisors may play an important role in financial advice when they possess soft information about the client. The analysis suggests that a hybrid solution consisting of discretion limits (produced by a robo‐advisor‐like platform) and advisor choice may be optimal.

publication date

  • March 1, 2020

has restriction

  • closed

Date in CU Experts

  • November 10, 2020 6:13 AM

Full Author List

  • Davies SW

author count

  • 1

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 2573-8615

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 2573-8615

Additional Document Info

volume

  • 3

issue

  • 1