Repugnant Accuracy Journal Article uri icon



  • AbstractAccuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences in certain propositions have no, or almost no, epistemic value. I prove that this is incompatible with standard accuracy‐first arguments for probabilism, and argue that there is no way for accuracy‐first epistemology to show that all credences of all agents should be coherent.

publication date

  • September 1, 2019

has restriction

  • closed

Date in CU Experts

  • January 9, 2020 2:18 AM

Full Author List

  • Talbot B

author count

  • 1

published in

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0029-4624

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1468-0068

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 540

end page

  • 563


  • 53


  • 3