R&D Networks: Theory, Empirics, and Policy Implications Journal Article uri icon



  • We analyze a model of R&D alliance networks where firms are engaged in R&D collaborations that lower their production costs while competing on the product market. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium and determine the optimal R&D subsidy program that maximizes total welfare. We then structurally estimate this model using a unique panel of R&D collaborations and annual company reports. We use our estimates to study the impact of targeted versus nondiscriminatory R&D subsidy policies and empirically rank firms according to the welfare-maximizing subsidies they should receive.

publication date

  • July 1, 2019

has restriction

  • green

Date in CU Experts

  • February 21, 2019 9:12 AM

Full Author List

  • K├Ânig MD; Liu X; Zenou Y

author count

  • 3

Other Profiles

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0034-6535

Electronic International Standard Serial Number (EISSN)

  • 1530-9142

Additional Document Info

start page

  • 476

end page

  • 491


  • 101


  • 3